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Does Wage Rank Affect Employees’ Well-being? 
 
 
Abstract 
How do workers make wage comparisons? Both an experimental study and an 
analysis of 16,000 British employees are reported. Satisfaction and well-being levels 
are shown to depend on more than simple relative pay. They depend upon the ordinal 
rank of an individual’s wage within a comparison group. ‘Rank’ itself thus seems to 
matter to human beings. Moreover, consistent with psychological theory, quits in a 
workplace are correlated with pay distribution skewness. 
 
 
JEL codes: J3; J28; I31.  
Key words: Range-frequency theory; relative wages; rank; job satisfaction; well-being; 
happiness; comparison income; pay differentials. 
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“Negatively skewed distributions of events … are the most conducive to 
happiness… Thus, the contextual theory of happiness differs from the 
theory of expected utility so popular in economics and decision 
analysis.” Allen Parducci (1995, p. 102) 
 
I. Introduction 
This paper argues that human well-being depends in a particular way upon 
comparisons with others. An individual is influenced not just by relative income but 
by the rank-ordered position of his or her wage within a comparison set (for example, 
whether the individual is the fourth most highly paid person in the organization, or the 
forty-fourth most highly paid). Human beings, in other words, value ordinal position 
per se.  
Economists’ formal models rarely consider a role for income rank in utility 
functions (although the idea is discussed in Layard 1980 and Frank 1985, and 
Hopkins and Kornienko 2004 consider related ideas). Nevertheless, there are natural 
intuitive arguments. First, if preferences are strongly shaped by evolutionary biology, 
it might be expected that rank would be of importance to humans. For a female who is 
searching for a mate, for example, the desirability of a male depends on his ordered 
position -- where the ordering is over resources that will be available to offspring -- 
within a hierarchy of possible sexual partners. Second, casual observation of the 
world suggests that human beings are deeply interested in rankings -- over sports 
outcomes, over incomes as described in newspaper ‘rich lists’, over even lists of 
economists (as in repec.org) -- to an extent that seems hard to understand if the sole 
purpose of rankings is the provision of information. Third, if people care about 
ordinal standing rather than absolute income, this would be one way to rationalize the 
famous observation of Richard Easterlin (1974) that reported happiness does not rise 
as a nation becomes wealthier. Moreover, as discussed later, concern about rank is not 
synonymous with concern over relative wages (as defined, say, by the individual’s 
income divided by mean group income). Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) and Layard 
(1980, 2005) point out that behavior and socially optimal allocations are not identical 
under these two different assumptions.  
This paper draws upon a model known as Range Frequency Theory (Parducci, 
1965; 1995). Although unfamiliar to economists and most industrial relations 
researchers, this model leads to the theoretical prediction that well-being is shaped by 
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the ordinal position of a person’s wage within a comparison set of others’ wage levels. 
As we try to show later, the theory fits the patterns observed in data. 
Textbook economics assumes that a person’s utility varies positively with 
their absolute pay level and negatively with the number of hours worked. Workers 
like income and dislike effort. This can be expressed as a utility function: 
 
u = u(wabs, h, i, j)         (1)
  
where u is the utility or well-being gained from working, wabs is the absolute level of 
wage income, h is hours of work, and the additional parameters are characteristics of 
the individual worker (i) and the job (j). Much research within psychology has also 
focussed on absolute, rather than relative, pay levels.  
Nevertheless, some researchers have attempted to capture the intuition that 
relative wages may be an important determinant of utility. For example, Hamermesh 
(1975) argued that utility might be derived from obtaining wages greater than the 
average wage of an appropriate comparison group. Rees (1993) discussed a number of 
informal arguments for the importance of relative wages in determining perceived 
fairness and wage satisfaction. Clark and Oswald (1996), using data collected from 
5,000 UK workers, found evidence consistent with the idea that utility depends partly 
on income relative to some reference or comparison income level. Groot and Van den 
Brink (1999) concluded that pay satisfaction is determined by relative rather than 
absolute wages. Using panel data, Clark (2003) showed that the impact of 
unemployment on well-being is subject to social-comparison effects. Blanchflower 
and Oswald (2004) and Luttmer (2005) argued, using somewhat different methods, 
that Americans are happier in areas where their neighbors are poorer. More generally, 
attitudes are known to be correlated with well-being (for example, Di Tella & 
MacCulloch 2005). A number of other studies have emphasized the importance of 
some kind of reference group in determining pay and job satisfaction.i This way of 
thinking leads to an expression for the utility function such as: 
 
u = u(wabs, wmean, h, i, j)        (2) 
 
where the additional term, wmean, is a reference wage that is taken to be negatively 
associated with utility. Comparison effects of the type embodied in Equation 2 have 
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been a concern of the social sciences outside economics, most notably in studies of 
relative deprivation (Runciman, 1966) and in epidemiological research (Marmot, 
1994).  
More recently, it has been emphasised that disutility may stem from 
discrepancies between the current state and an aspiration level (e.g. Gilboa & 
Schmeidler, 2001; Stutzer, 2004). A related idea, that losses and gains are assessed 
not in absolute terms but in terms of the change from a reference point (such as the 
current state), has received wide currency in prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979; see also Munro & Sugden, 2003). The theoretical implications for economic 
models of a concern for relative income have also been discussed.ii However, only a 
little research has focussed on how people actually determine the reference group (e.g. 
Bygren, 2004; Law & Wong, 1998).  
In principle, more than one reference point may be used to determine worker 
satisfaction (cf. Kahneman, 1992). Then, in some form, income ‘rank’ effects can 
occur.iii A concern for rank-based status might have neurobiological underpinnings or 
serve an evolutionarily useful informational role (Zizzo, 2002; Samuelson, 2004). It 
should be mentioned in passing that our paper’s attempt to employ a psychologically 
motivated model of rank-dependent satisfaction is consistent with a body of medical 
research that has been concerned -- in part by following longitudinally a Whitehall 
sample of British civil servants -- with the effects of position and inequality upon 
health (e.g. Deaton, 2001; Marmot, 1994; Marmot & Bobak, 2000).  
The issue of rank-dependence has received little direct attention in the context 
of employee satisfaction, but some empirical findings have been consistent with a 
multiple-reference perspective. Ordonez, Connolly and Coughlan (2000) presented 
evidence that the judged fairness of a salary level was determined by comparisons to 
more than one referent (cf. also Highhouse, Brooks-Laber, Lin, & Spitzmueller, 2003; 
Seidl, Traub, & Morone, 2003). Mellers (1982) examined how individuals chose to 
achieve fairness when they were given a sum of money to allocate between 
hypothetical members of a university faculty. The results demonstrated that the 
distribution of merit was relevant. Mellers (1986) showed that a concern for rank 
helped account for judgments of “fair” allocations of costs (taxes). Ratings of 
happiness also seem to be determined by the skewness of the distribution of events 
(Smith, Diener, & Wedell, 1989), and by the shape of nations’ income distributions 
(Hagerty, 2000). Yet, within the economics literature, little attention is paid to the 
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distribution of gains, losses, probabilities, or risks on the treatment of any individual 
loss, gain, or probability (although see e.g. Cox & Oaxaca, 1989; Lopes, 1987).  
We now lay out an approach based on Range Frequency Theory, which is due 
to Allen Parducci of the University of California (RFT: Parducci, 1965, 1995). Later 
we relate RFT to models of inequality aversion (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). 
While economists’ modelling is traditionally individualistic, Parducci’s 
argument is that context matters, and in a fundamental way. Contextual effects on 
judgment have been investigated empirically (for example, Parducci, 1965, 1995). 
Models of context have begun to be applied in economic and consumer psychology.iv 
In a different domain, Oswald and Powdthavee (2007) study how obesity relative to 
others’ weight may affect utility.  
The possibility that judgments, for example of a wage, are made relative to a 
single reference point is reminiscent of Helson’s (1964) Adaptation Level Theory. 
This theory assumes that judgments about simple perceptual magnitudes -- such as 
weights, loudnesses, or brightnesses -- are made in relation to the weighted mean of 
contextual stimuli. While “reference point” models often assume that judgments are 
made in relation to a mean level of some kind, there is evidence that human beings are 
influenced by the endpoints and variance of a distribution (see Volkmann, 1951; 
Janiszewski & Lichtenstein, 1999).  
A central idea in Range Frequency Theory is that the ordinal position of an 
item within a ranking is important. The conceptual issues are illustrated in Figure 1. 
Here the items can be thought of as magnitudes along any continuum (such as prices, 
wages, probabilities, weights, line lengths). Consider point X in Figure 1. How will its 
magnitude be judged? Point X has the same arithmetical value in distribution A as in 
distribution B. In both cases, X is the same distance from the mean. It is also the same 
distance from the mid-point, and from the end points. Simple reference theory, such 
as that underlying the idea that a worker’s utility depends on the ratio of pay to mean 
pay, then makes a clear prediction. It suggests that people should be indifferent 
between point X in distribution A and in distribution B. Yet it has been confirmed by 
empirical observation in a number of settings that human beings tend to judge the 
magnitude of X as lower in distribution A (where X is the second lowest stimulus 
rather than the fifth lowest one). Analogous considerations apply, in reverse, for a 
stimulus like that represented by point Y (see Parducci, 1995, for a review). 
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 Range Frequency Theory was initially designed for uni-dimensional stimuli 
such as weights, line lengths, or tones. The conceptual model developed by Parducci 
(1965, 1995) rests on the idea that feelings triggered by a stimulus are determined by 
both its position within a range and its ordinal position. This can be expressed as 
follows.  
 Assume an ordered set of n items: 
 
{x1, x2,….. xi,…. xn} 
 
Then, if Mi is the subjective psychological magnitude of xi, that magnitude is taken to 
be given by the simple convex combination:  
 
iii FwwRM )1( −+=          (3) 
 
where w is a weight and Ri is the range value of stimulus i : 
 
Ri =
xi − x1
xn − x1
         (4) 
 
and Fi is the frequency value (in the language of Parducci), or, perhaps in more 
natural terminology, the ranked ordinal position of SI, within the ordered set: 
 
Fi =
i −1
n −1
.         (5) 
 
In other words, for a worker who is the 20th best-paid employee out of the 101 people 
in her workplace, Fi will be 0.19.  
 The subjective magnitude of a stimulus is thus assumed by Range Frequency 
Theory to be given by a weighted average of R and F. It is a convex combination of (a) 
the position of the stimulus along a line made up of the lowest and highest points in 
the set and (b) the rank ordered position of the stimulus with regard to the other 
contextual stimuli. To get consistency of units, Mi is constrained to values between 0 
and 1. If subjective magnitude estimates are given on, e.g., a 1 to 7 scale, then an 
appropriate linear transformation into the unit interval is done. Here w is a weighting 
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parameter. In physical judgments in the laboratory, this is often estimated at 
approximately 0.5. We might hypothesize that an employee’s feelings of satisfaction 
will be governed equivalently within a set of comparison wages (see Seidl et al., 2003, 
for a related hypothesis).  
 Various testable ideas can be viewed as being nested within the following 
utility equation: 
 
u = u(wabs, wmean, wrank, wrange, h, i, j)      (6) 
 
where wrank and wrange are, respectively, defined for wages as in Equations 4 and 5. In 
this formulation, wabs and wmean remain in the model. If pure RFT were to govern 
satisfaction, the variables wabs and wmean would have no influence on u.  
 Smith, Diener, and Wedell (1989), in a laboratory-based study, found that 
RFT gave a fairly good account of both overall happiness ratings, and individual 
event ratings, when the happiness-giving events were drawn from positively and 
negatively skewed distributions. Hagerty (2000) concluded that, as predicted by RFT, 
mean happiness ratings were greater in communities where the income distributions 
were less positively skewed. He found that this effect held both within and across 
countries. In addition, Mellers (1982, 1986) concluded that RFT could give a coherent 
account of the judged fairness of wage distributions. Finally, Highhouse et al. (2003) 
found that salary expectations conformed to RFT principles, and Seidl et al. (2003) 
used RFT to model categorisation of incomes in a hypothetical currency. Yet this 
analytical approach has made almost no impression on the discipline of economics. 
 The next three sections of the paper test the idea that RFT can be used to 
understand workers’ wellbeing using complementary methods: a laboratory-based 
study (Section II); analysis of self-rated workplace well-being using large-scale 
surveys (Section III); an analysis of quits (Section IV).  
   
 
II Investigation 1: A Small Experiment  
The paper’s first test, Investigation 1, uses wage-satisfaction data from a laboratory 
setting.  
 We asked undergraduates -- a relatively homogeneous group -- to rate how 
satisfied they would be with wages that they might be offered for their first job after 
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college. None was familiar with RFT. The key experimental manipulation was of the 
distribution of other hypothetical wages said to be offered to their classmates for 
similar jobs.  
In this way, the subjects expressed feelings about each potential wage in the 
context of a set of other wages. Six different wage distributions were used. There were 
11 hypothetical wages in each distribution. Each participant was required to evaluate 
how satisfied they would be with each pay level.  
The wage distributions are illustrated in Figure 2, while the actual wages used 
are listed in Table 1. The first two distributions (A and B, which are here denoted 
unimodal and bimodal, respectively) are designed to test for rank-dependence, and 
follow the logic illustrated in Figure 1. Three wages are common to both distributions 
(excluding the lowest and highest wages); these are labelled A1 – A3 and B1 – B3. 
Points A1 and B1 in Figure 2 are the same distance from the mean. They are also the 
same proportion up the range from lowest to highest. Thus, according to a simple 
reference-wage view, A1 and B1 should be given the same ratings. So should A2 and 
B2. So too should A3 and B3. According to the hypothesis of rank-dependence, in 
contrast, point A1 will be rated as less satisfying than will B1 (because A1 is the 
second lowest wage, while B2 is the 5th lowest). The reverse will be true for A3 and 
B3. Points A2 and B2 ought to receive the same rating in both cases. By design, 
therefore, distributions A and B should provide a clean test -- of a very simple kind -- 
for the existence of rank-dependence. 
The next two distributions in Figure 2, namely C (positive skew) and D 
(negative skew), test the explanatory ability of the model when the distribution is 
negatively skewed. These distributions, C and D, have two points in common. The 
fifth-highest wage in the negatively skewed distribution is the same as the second-
highest wage in the positively skewed distribution. The second-lowest wage in the 
negatively skewed distribution is the same as the fifth-lowest wage in the positively 
skewed distribution. However, the distributions have different means. Hence any 
difference in satisfaction ratings is theoretically ambiguous, because the relevant 
wages differ between the distributions in both ranked position and in distance from 
the mean. The final two distributions, E (low range) and F (high range), allow a test 
of the idea that position up the range is important in determining wage satisfaction. 
The critical sixth-lowest wage is the same in both distributions, and represents both 
the mean and the median in each distribution. But in the low-range condition the 
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critical wage is 60% up the range from lowest to highest wage, while it is 40% up the 
range in the high range condition. A difference in the satisfaction from this critical 
wage ought then to be unambiguous evidence for a ‘range’ effect on well-being.  
Twenty-four laboratory subjects were tested. The results turned out to be so 
uniform that it was felt unnecessary to extend the results to a larger sample. All 
subjects were first-year psychology students (17 women and 7 men, mean age=19.0 
years). They participated for course credit.  
Six rating scales and 66 coloured labels were used. Rating scales were 36 cm 
long by 4 cm wide strips of paper. On these, a 7-point scale (34 cm long) was drawn, 
in the centre of the strip. Each scale had seven equally spaced markers indicated 
(labelled 1-7). No other written information was present on the scale. Small labels 
were constructed to represent the wages to be rated; annual wages in pounds sterling 
were printed in a rectangular box on the labels; the top of each label was made in the 
shape of a pointer. Labels were presented to subjects in an unordered fashion. By 
placing the label’s pointer at the appropriate place on the scale, this could be used to 
indicate the satisfaction rating for the hypothetical wage. 
The experimental design was within-subjects, with six levels of annual wage 
distribution (as illustrated in Figure 2 and described above). Table 1 lists the wage 
values. A 6 x 6 Latin square design was used. 
 Participants were tested individually and given written instructions. The task 
was to state how satisfied they would be with each of 11 hypothetical annual starting 
salaries. This was, by design, within the context of the other 10 salaries offered to 
classmates. They were asked to imagine that these were starting salaries offered to 
similar graduates entering a similar occupation. Subjects were then required to assess 
the eleven salaries using a 7-point rating scale, with 1 being “least satisfied,” and 7 to 
“most satisfied”. After they finished their evaluations, the experimenter measured the 
chosen positions of the labels. A new rating scale was then provided to participants 
with a different set of labels for the next distribution. 
The results of this simple experiment are shown in Figure 3. We analysed the 
data in three ways. First, we examined the overall ability of the RFT model to fit the 
data. Second, we compared the satisfaction levels assigned to the wages that were 
common to different distributions. Finally, we embedded RFT within a more general 
framework, and compared its performance with other extant models. 
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Our analysis started with the RFT model of Equation 3. We computed the 
best-fitting parameter estimates. This is akin to fitting standard OLS of satisfaction 
responses on rank and range as covariates, but where the parameters are constrained 
to be w and 1-w. There is just one free parameter: the parameter w that specifies the 
weighting given to the ranking dimension relative to the range dimension. We 
adopted the conservative procedure of holding w constant for all six distributions; 
there was therefore a single value of one parameter to estimate for all 66 data points 
(11 in each of 6 distributions). The fit, from the pooled estimates, is shown as a solid 
line in each of the three figures (Figure 3a to 3c). A good match between model and 
data was also obtained when results from individual subjects were modeled, providing 
reassurance that the overall fit did not reflect averaging artefacts or the chance 
selection of a few idiosyncratic participants. The overall R2 value obtained is .998, 
and the estimate of w is 0.36.  
Model-comparison statistics confirmed the importance of both range and rank. 
We compared the goodness of fit of the model with and without the w parameter 
included (Borowiak, 1989). A restricted model, in which only range influences ratings, 
produced a significantly less good fit: (χ2(1)=241.9, p<.001). So too did a restricted 
model in which only ranked position influences satisfaction ratings: (χ2 (1)=169.1, 
p<.001).  
This method assumes that the psychological magnitudes, prior to assessment, 
are a linear function of actual wage amount. We explored the possibility that a 
logarithmic or power-law transformation of the wage variables might instead improve 
the fit of the model. In neither case, however, did this lead to a significant increase in 
the explained variance. 
We find other evidence for rank-dependence. The differences in the mean 
rating of common points in comparative conditions were analysed using ANOVA. 
There are three critical wage stimuli for the unimodal and bimodal distributions. They 
are the points labelled A1 through B3 in Figure 2. These points permit a test of the 
effect of rank when proportion up the range, and distance from the mean, are both 
held constant. An initial two-way ANOVA on the ratings given to the common points 
found, as expected, a main effect of point within distribution (F(2,46)=809.17; 
p<.001); no main effect of distribution (F(1,23)=0.60); and an interaction between 
them (F(2,46)=124.68; p<.001). Tests confirmed that -- at high levels of significance -
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- the wage of £20.0K was rated as less satisfying when it was the second lowest wage 
than when it was the fifth lowest wage. Moreover, the wage of £25.6K was rated as 
more satisfying when it was the second highest wage than when it was the fifth 
highest. 
In the comparison of positive skew and negative skew, £19.5K and £26.1K 
were the common salaries in both cases. The range difference between these points 
and the endpoints was the same in both conditions, but the positions in the rank orders 
were different. The salary £19.5K is the fifth lowest wage in the positive-skew 
condition but the second lowest in the negatively skewed condition. Conversely, 
£26.1K ranks second highest in the positive-skew condition but fifth highest in the 
negative-skew condition. Because the means of the two distributions were not the 
same, the distances of the common points to the mean were also different. A 2 x 2 
(common points X condition) ANOVA was used, and found the expected main effects 
of condition (ratings were higher in the positively skewed condition: F(1,23)=159.99; 
p<.001) and point (ratings were higher for wages in the positive condition: 
F(1,23)=1860.02; p<.001). The interaction was not significant (F(1,23)=1.0). 
Satisfaction levels were consistently higher, at all reasonable confidence levels, in the 
positively skewed than in the negatively skewed case. This was true for both the 
lower wage and the higher wage. These results are strongly consistent with RFT. 
The single common point for the high-range and low-range conditions can be 
examined in a similar way. Salary £22.8, which was the mean and the median of the 
distribution, has the same ranked position in both distributions, but different range 
values. A paired-sample t-test was used, and the analysis revealed, consistent with the 
predictions of RFT, that the effect of range was significant: t(23) = 2.435, p< .05 (two 
tailed). These results are consistent with those of Seidl et al. (2003) who, in a study 
that came to our notice after the present experiments were completed, demonstrated 
that RFT gave a good account of experimentally-obtained categorizations of incomes 
in a hypothetical currency. The results are also consistent with studies that have paid 
subjects according to different distributions, which have shown that subjects receiving 
a negatively skewed distribution of rewards report greater satisfaction (Parducci 1968, 
1995). 
 We should note a possible limitation of the experiment. The laboratory-based 
nature of the design may lead subjects to perform in a particular way. However, this 
difficulty is tackled in the next section of the paper where a real-world setting is 
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employed. We also should note that the pay information was simultaneously and 
visually available to subjects, perhaps increasing the likelihood that it would be 
processed in the same way as other physical stimuli. A further experiment, not 
reported here, addressed this issue by presenting wages for sequential evaluation, and 
RFT fitted the data. 
Compared to RFT theory, how well might other models do? It has been argued 
that the notion of fairness needs to be incorporated into conceptions of utility.v If pay 
satisfaction depends on perceived unfairness, then models of inequity perception 
could be applied to the present case. Given that RFT has already been shown to 
provide a good fit to fair-salary increases and tax assignments (Mellers, 1982, 1986), 
the present data provide an opportunity to examine the different predictions of RFT 
and economic models of inequity as applied to wage satisfaction.  
Can economic models mirror the predictions of the psychologically-motivated 
RFT? Fehr and Schmidt (2001) set out a model of inequity aversion. In intuitive terms, 
the idea is that utility may depend on (a) an absolute level of resource xi, (b) the total 
weight of resources above xi, and (c) the total weight of resources below xi. Hence 
individuals dislike inequity. In other words, an individual might lose well-being or 
utility even if he or she is at the top of the relevant income distribution. More 
specifically, the utility function of individual i earning an amount xi would be:  
 
vi(x) = xi −α i
1
n −1
max{x j − xi,0}
j≠i
∑ − βi 1
n −1
max{xi − x j,0}
j≠ i
∑                    (7) 
 
The first term measures the utility gained from absolute income. The second and third 
terms measure the disutility that stems from upward and downward inequality (α and 
β assumed positive). Here the second term, when appropriately normalised, is closely 
akin to models of relative deprivation of the type used to predict mortality risk (as in 
Deaton, 2001) according to which relative deprivation is measured by the weight of 
the income distribution above a particular income (see also Kakwani, 1984; Yitzhaki, 
1979).  
 Such an approach could be extended. In comparing one’s wage xi with others, 
it seems reasonable to suppose that utility might be gained as a function of the weight 
of incomes below xi, and lost as a function of the weight of incomes above xi. Then, if 
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the sign of the third term in (7) above is reversed, and α and β are both positive, the 
Fehr-Schmidt formulation can be extended to provide a potential model of 
comparison-based wage utility. 
 This version of Fehr-Schmidt model differs from Range Frequency Theory in 
one important way. It assumes that higher and lower earners are weighted more 
heavily as their distance from xi increases. According to RFT, however, only the 
numbers of people with higher and lower incomes matter. Both models contrast with 
an alternative approach, developed below, in which incomes similar to xi carry most 
weight in determining the utility associated with xi. A further difference between the 
Fehr-Schmidt model and RFT is that only the former can accommodate individual 
differences in relative concern with upward and downward comparisons. Such 
differences exist. For example, Stutzer (2004) found that, when income and other 
individual characteristics are controlled for, well-being is lower among people with 
higher income aspiration levels. 
The principles embodied in RFT, and those incorporated in the Fehr-Schmidt 
model, can be seen as special cases of a more general conceptual framework. In 
intuitive terms, we can distinguish three different ways in which income-derived 
utility might be rank-dependent.  
First, as in the Fehr-Schmidt model, higher and lower wages may be weighted 
by their difference from xi. Such an approach receives support from the plausibility 
and empirical success of similar models of relative deprivation.  
Second, as in RFT, the mere ordinal rank of xi may matter.  
Third, and contrary to the Fehr-Schmidt approach, incomes relatively close to 
xi may contribute more strongly than distant incomes in determining rank-dependent 
utility for xi. This idea would be consistent with the considerable weight of evidence 
suggesting that social comparisons occur with generally similar agents (e.g. Festinger, 
1954) and that pay referents tend to be similar (e.g. Law & Wong, 1998).  
We show that these three different approaches can be captured within a single 
framework as follows. First, note that the rank component of RFT (equation 5) can be 
rewritten as: 
 
Fi = 0.5 +
(i −1) − (N − i)
2(N −1)                                                         (7*) 
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where Fi  is the frequency value of wage xi and N is the number of incomes in the 
comparison set. Thus for a fixed comparison set, Fi  decreases linearly with the 
number of higher incomes (N-i) and increases linearly with the number of lower 
incomes (i-1). 
 A more general extension of RFT (equation 3) can now be written as follows: 
 
 
Ui(x) = wRi + (1− w ) 0.5 +
α (
j=1
i−1
∑ x i − x j )γ − β (
j= i+1
N
∑ x j − x i)γ
2(α (
j=1
i−1
∑ xi − x j )γ + β (
j= i+1
N
∑ x j − xi)γ )
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          (8) 
 
where w  is the weighting on the range component (cf. equation 3). Note that α now 
weights downward comparisons, and β weights upward comparisons.  
 The three models outlined earlier are special cases of equation (8), with 
particular values of γ  corresponding to the particular models. When γ  = 0, and α = β, 
(8) reduces to Range Frequency Theory.vi Every higher and lower income contributes 
equally, independently of its distance from the to-be-judged wage, in influencing the 
overall judgment. When γ  = 1, the rank-dependent component of (8) is akin to the 
Fehr-Schmidt model. Comparison incomes diminish utility to the extent that they are 
greater than xi and increase utility to the extent that they are less than xi. The range-
dependent component mimics the absolute component in the Fehr-Schmidt model if 
appropriate anchor values are assumed. When γ  < 0, the equation behaves as a model 
in which incomes close to xi carry greater weight. Finally, as γ  becomes > 1, 
increasingly high weight is given to incomes further away from xi. 
 Here we fit our generalized model to the behavior of participants in 
Experiment 1. In all model-fitting, we assume a constant value of α, w, and γ  across 
distributions. We first fit the model to the mean data. 
 If γ  is set to zero, thereby mimicking RFT but with α and w allowed to vary, 
an R2 value of 0.998 is obtained. In this case, the best-fitting estimates of α and w are 
1.01 and 0.36 respectively. Thus the unconstrained estimates of α and β are close to 
equal as implicitly assumed by RFT. 
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 We next set γ  to 1. This allows us to examine the behavior of the model 
derived from the Fehr-Schmidt approach. An overall R2 of 0.941 was obtained, and 
the best-fitting estimates of α and w were 1.02 and 0.61. More importantly, when as 
here the same parameter estimates are used for all the different distributions of 
hypothetical wages, the Fehr-Schmidt approach cannot accommodate the qualitative 
patterns in the data. 
 Next, we let γ  vary freely. The value of γ  was estimated at 0.0004 — or in 
other words very close to the value of zero implicitly assumed by RFT. Estimates of 
α and w were 1.01 and 0.36.vii  
Finally, we estimated parameters for all 24 individual subjects. A median R2 
of .968 was obtained, confirming that the model provided a good account of data at 
the level of individual subjects. Estimates of α, w, and γ  were 1.02, 0.37, and -.004 
respectively. The corresponding standard deviations were 0.12, 0.16, and 0.18. Thus 
the individual-subjects analysis confirmed the key conclusions: α  did not differ 
significantly from 1.0, and γ  did not differ significantly from zero. 
Hence it seems that RFT, with its assumption that only the number of higher 
and lower earners influences utility, offers the most parsimonious account of the data. 
Our experimental procedure offered the potential for the data to reject RFT, as would 
have occurred for example if the satisfaction-wage curves had been consistently 
concave. Furthermore, RFT performed as well as a more general model in which the 
influence of contextual wages differed as a function of their difference from the target. 
 
III Investigation 2: Well-being in the Workplace 
The paper’s second test draws on a data set that provides both information on actual 
workplaces and, unusually, matched information on the characteristics of individual 
workers within those establishments. It uses a range of reported well-being measures, 
namely, a number of kinds of employee-satisfaction scores. It is known that 
satisfaction measures are reliable over time (see Bradburn & Caplovitz, 1965) and 
correlate with measures of both mental and physical health (e.g. Palmore, 1969; Sales 
& House, 1971; Wall, Clegg, & Jackson, 1978). Furthermore, such measures are 
correlated with behavior (Clark, 2001; Freeman, 1978; Shields & Ward, 2001). 
Data were drawn from the United Kingdom’s Workplace Employee Relations 
Surveys (WERS). The most recent survey was in 1997-1998 (WERS98); this was the 
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first to include employee questionnaires and it is these that provide the data for the 
research reported here. The data set allows us to match up information on individual 
workers with information on the plants that employ them. 
All places of employment in Britain -- including schools, shops, offices and 
factories -- with ten or more employees were eligible to be sampled. For this study, 
the usable sample is 1782 workplaces. Approximately 28,000 employees contributed 
completed questionnaires (a response rate of 64%). Up to 25 employee questionnaires 
were distributed to randomly-selected employees within each organisation. The 
design of WERS98 is summarised in Cully (1998); initial findings from the study are 
described in Cully et al. (1998).  
Employees were given self-completion questionnaires. They could return them 
either via the workplace or directly to the survey agency. Questions focussed on a 
range of issues including Employee Attitudes to Work, Payment Systems, Health & 
Safety, Worker Representation, and other related areas.  
The variables of particular interest to us are four measures of worker 
satisfaction, as listed below. Question A10 from the Survey was phrased as follows: 
 “How satisfied are you with the following aspects of your job?”  
Four aspects were listed:  
“The amount of influence you have over your job”;  
“The amount of pay you receive”;  
“The sense of achievement you get from your work”, and  
“The respect you get from supervisors/line managers”.  
A primary interest here will be on satisfaction with the amount of pay. It would not be 
surprising if measures such as satisfaction with influence are determined by an 
individual’s wage rank. Because we do not have an overall job-satisfaction measure in 
the data set, we present satisfaction equations for all measures available.  
Answers were on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (Very Satisfied) to 5 (Very 
Dissatisfied). A sixth “Don’t Know” option was also available. For ease of 
interpretation, the scaling here is reversed. Thus the number 5 represents the highest 
level of satisfaction. The satisfaction distributions themselves have thicker tails at the 
upper than the lower end. For example, on satisfaction with achievement, which is 
representative, approximately 15% of respondents give the answer ‘very satisfied’, 
50% say ‘satisfied’, 21% say ‘neither satisfied nor dissatisfied’, 11% say ‘dissatisfied’, 
and 4% say ‘very dissatisfied’.  
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The independent influences upon satisfaction include wage-related variables 
and background variables (which are included as controls within later regression 
equations). These background variables, listed in Table 2, are the age of the worker, 
the size of the plant, whether the worker is on a temporary contract, the educational 
level of the worker, gender, race, a union dummy, occupation, industry, region, hours 
worked by the employee, and the marital status of the employee.  
It is necessary for the analysis to construct a variety of wage measures. The 
variables we test as determinants of well-being include: 
1. wabs. Weekly pay of individual i  
2. wmean. Average pay in workplace j  
3. wrank. Rank of individual i in workplace j as proportion of number of workers, 
where greater rank indicates the worker is, in an ordinal sense, higher up the 
pay scale. This rank variable is calculated as (rankij - 1)/(number of 
observations workplacej - 1) 
4. wrange. The distance the individual worker is up the range of payi in workplace 
j. This is calculated as a proportion as: (payi - payjmin)/(payjmax - payjmin). 
For consistency with earlier literature, we work with mean wage rather than median 
wage. Both Rank and Range are defined so as to lie in the unit interval. Moreover, 
wabs and wmean are logarithmically transformed except where otherwise stated. Finally, 
rank and range (and mean wage) are calculated empirically over the samples drawn 
from each establishment.  
These different measures of pay are, of course, somewhat correlated. 
Nevertheless, the large number of observations makes it possible, in practice, to 
estimate the separate variables’ effects. The paper tests whether, with other factors 
held constant, wrank and wrange help to determine workers’ satisfaction levels.  
We generally worked with data collected from all workplaces that had at least 
15 employee-pay observations. The resulting sample contained 16,266 individuals 
from 886 separate workplaces.  
 The raw correlations between the main variables are shown in Table 3. Not 
surprisingly, workers’ reported well-being levels are in all but 3 of the 16 cases 
positively correlated with their (various measures of) remuneration. Four different 
satisfaction measures are available. These could be combined into a single average, 
but we decided it would be more transparent not to do so. Within Table 3, there are 
four wage measures. These are the log of the worker’s pay, the log of mean pay in the 
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plant, the worker’s rank in the wage ordering, and the range of pay within the plant. 
Out of necessity, they are calculated within the available sample, and are thus best 
thought of as estimates. In other words, here the rank and range for worker i are for 
the sample of workers available within WERS. Compared to the true model of the 
whole workplace, this means that Rank and Range are measured with error, which 
will tend to make it harder to find statistically significant effects. The pay measures 
are intercorrelated, with wabs (log transformed) having a correlation greater than 0.6 
with all of wrank, wrange, and wmean (log transformed). Even in the raw data depicted in 
Table 3, wrank is more highly correlated with satisfaction than any other pay measure. 
For instance, in the case of a sense of achievement, the correlation coefficient is 0.086 
with pay rank, compared to only 0.021 with actual pay.  
 Ordered probit analysis was undertaken. The background measures listed in 
Table 2 were always included; we do not report the coefficients for these variables, 
although the results are available on request. All columns in the regression tables 
reported below were estimated by the ordered probit technique. Standard errors are in 
parentheses and are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and clustering bias. The 
Pseudo R2 values were calculated using the McKelvey-Zavoina method. Pay 
measures were log transformed, but the findings were checked with untransformed 
measures and similar results were obtained. Although, in general, ordered probit 
coefficients do not have the simple interpretation of OLS coefficients, we have 
checked that in later equations the coefficients can typically be read off in a fairly 
intuitive way.  
After controlling for other factors, does satisfaction depend upon the level of 
pay? Table 4a shows the results for the largest possible sample. Table 4b gives the 
results for a restricted sample that excludes small plants. There are four satisfaction 
equations: for Influence, Pay, Achievement and Respect. Each well-being regression 
equation is to be read vertically. In both the full and the restricted sample, the 
logarithm of absolute pay wabs has a statistically significant effect within the four 
satisfaction equations. The coefficients are similar in both samples. This preliminary 
analysis provides reassurance that the restricted sample is representative; subsequent 
analysis focuses on the restricted sample alone as it was deemed more reliable for 
analysis of wrange and wrank. 
 Next, we test for comparison effects. Our data are rich in that they allow us to 
compute the average pay within the workplace. Hence we can do a more direct test 
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than Clark and Oswald (1996), who define an individual’s comparison group as those 
workers in the data set who have similar characteristics to the individual. The result of 
adding wmean into the equation is shown in Table 5. In each case, the own-wage 
variable, which is denoted Ln(pay), remains positive, and its coefficient is statistically 
significantly different from zero in all of the four columns. Money continues, 
therefore, to buy extra well-being. For Table 5’s satisfaction equations for Influence, 
Achievement and Respect, the comparison wage wmean enters with a negative 
coefficient, with a standard error generally of approximately one third of the 
coefficient. Interestingly, wmean accounts for little or no significant additional variance 
within the 2nd column’s equation for pay satisfaction. Moreover, it has a positive sign. 
It is possible that this is the ‘ambition’ effect of Senik (2006), namely, that workers 
are pleased to work somewhere where their pay may rise through future promotions. 
But that can only be a conjecture.  
To summarize, we find quite strong evidence for a relative-wage effect upon 
satisfaction. This is true for three of the four measures of reported well-being, and 
after controlling for a set of worker and workplace characteristics. Table 5 therefore 
adds to an accumulating econometric literature on comparison effects upon well-being.  
Next, to nest Range Frequency Theory within the framework, the wrank and 
wrange measures are added into each well-being equation. The results are shown in 
Table 6a. This is the specification for the more general model set out earlier in 
equation 6.  
The results seem quite striking. To an economist, particularly given the likely 
amount of measurement error, it might be viewed as surprising that variables such as 
rank – where I lie in an ordinal sense in a sample of 25 workers from my 
establishment – partially predicts reported satisfaction with pay. Nevertheless, that is 
what the data seem to show.  
In Table 6a, the variable measuring the individual worker’s position in the pay 
ordering wrank works strongly in the equations. It has an independent positive effect in 
a way consistent with the hypothesis of rank-dependence. This is perhaps the main 
finding of the paper: in both the laboratory and in real-world data there is evidence 
that ordinal rank matters, and indeed may matter more than the level of pay itself.  
The coefficient for wmean in the pay satisfaction equation is, rather 
unexpectedly, positive.viii  The coefficients on wmean in the other three columns in 
Table 6a are not significantly different from zero at the 5% level. One possible 
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(admittedly speculative) interpretation of the positive mean-wage finding is that 
workers view themselves as having better prospects in a highly-paid workplace. 
Future research will have to return to this issue.  
 In a search for a parsimonious specification, further analysis was carried out, 
in which the only pay variables were wabs with either wrank (Table 6b) or wrange (Table 
6c). In these, both wrank and wrange accounted for significant additional variance 
beyond that accounted for by absolute pay wabs and the background variables. It turns 
out that the Rank variable somewhat outperforms the Range variable.  
How broad is the comparison sample that provides the context? Do workers 
ever really compare themselves with a person like Bill Gates? A further analysis 
aimed to accommodate the idea that comparison for an individual might take place 
within the same occupational category.  
One might hypothesize that two processes are involved in the determination of 
satisfaction. The first requires that a comparison or contextual set is chosen, while the 
second process involves the decision about an overt satisfaction rating. Our paper is 
concerned primarily with the second process, but it is likely that the first process 
involves some kind of ‘similarity-based’ sampling. For example, one might include in 
one’s comparison set those people of similar age and wage to oneself, those people in 
similar occupations, and those who are geographically close (Bygren, 2004; Festinger, 
1954; Law & Wong, 1998). According to Kahneman and Miller’s (1986) Norm 
Theory, a stimulus or event is judged and interpreted in the context of an evoked set 
of relevant stimuli or events that are retrieved (often due to their similarity) by the 
event to be judged. There is evidence that human memory works in a way that would 
lead to formation of such a comparison set (e.g. Brown, Neath, & Chater, 2007; 
Hintzman, 1986; Nosofsky, 1986).  
The analysis attempted to address this issue. This was done by examining a 
subset of the WERS98 data that could take into account people’s type of work (using 
Occupational Group codes). We confined analysis to the largest occupational group 
within an organisation, and used only cases where there were at least 10 employee 
observations in that largest occupation. This reduced the sample size to 4744 
individuals from 373 separate workplaces. The results were essentially identical to 
those obtained in the larger analyses on groups not differentiated by occupation, 
although the effect of wrange was weaker. Here we report only the final analyses – 
those that examine, separately, the effects of wrank and of wrange when the effects of 
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wabs, are partialled out. The results are in Tables 7a and 7b. It is evident that wage 
satisfaction, as well as most other satisfaction measures, is independently predicted by 
wrank. As before, the Rank effect is positive and seems highly robust. Because of the 
size of the sample, it was not possible to estimate simultaneously the effects of range 
and rank in workplaces and occupations. 
Although the emphasis here has been on whether rank and range have 
statistically significant effects, their size is also of interest. As one fairly 
representative example, consider the variable ‘satisfaction with achievement’. In this 
case, a movement in Rank from zero to unity raises quite noticeably the likelihood of 
being satisfied. The probability of giving either the top or second-top satisfaction 
answer here increases, holding the other independent variables constant, from 
approximately 61% to 70%. To put this in perspective, in most specifications the level 
of absolute pay would have to more than triple to get the same effect.  
Some potential criticisms and counter-arguments should be mentioned.  
• First, there is no guarantee in these workplaces that workers actually 
know other people’s wage rates. All we can say is that people act as 
though they are able to form a reasonable estimate of where, as 
individuals, they lie in the pay ordering and the range. It would be 
interesting to examine plants and offices with confidential pay scales, 
and to ascertain whether people want others to be able to see that they 
are high in income-rank.  
• Second, it seems important to understand exactly how a person 
chooses a reference group. Our paper has little to contribute to this 
issue. We are forced in our econometric specification simply to assume 
that the workplace is the comparison set.  
• Third, given the sometimes positive nature of comparisons in the pay 
satisfaction equations, it would be interesting to be able to say more 
about the lifetime dynamics of pay. Low wages today may be 
compensated by high wages after promotion tomorrow. More research 
here will be needed.  
• Fourth, we are unable to control directly for job titles, and this kind of 
‘rank’ is likely also to play a role in well-being, even though it is 
unobservable in our data set.  
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• Fifth, without enormous samples, measurement error is inevitably a 
problem in the construction of our Rank and Range variables. In this 
study, probably the best that can be done is to check, as we have done, 
that the findings go through for sub-samples of small as well as large 
workplaces.  
• Sixth, in principle, it might be that wage variables such as Rank are 
merely proxying for an omitted non-linearity in the form that absolute 
pay takes in the well-being equations. Our checks with higher-order 
pay polynomials, however, suggest that this is not the explanation.  
• Seventh, it might perhaps be argued that an allowance for additional 
‘moments’ of the pay distribution is bound to improve upon simpler 
specifications, so that, by Occam’s razor, standard models should be 
preferred. Yet that objection seems to miss the key point. Our data 
suggest that, when a direct comparison is done, a rank variable 
strongly outperforms a simple relative-wage variable. 
• Eighth, could it be that Rank is merely a proxy for omitted variables 
like job autonomy, and it is those omitted factors that raise well-being? 
It is never feasible in empirical research to dispose entirely of this kind 
of possibility. Nevertheless, the first section of the paper shows that 
RFT fits the data in an experimental setting where there is no influence 
from job characteristics like autonomy. 
 
IV Investigation 3: Quits in Workplace Data 
Up to this point, the paper has concentrated on reported levels of well-being, and has 
viewed those numbers as providing proxy utility data. Such an approach seems to be 
of some worth in its own right. It also fits with much recent literature, such as Luttmer 
(2005). However, to show that RFT also has implications for observable actions, we 
now estimate labor-turnover equations. 
Information on the individual workers who choose to leave is not available 
within our data set. Hence it is not possible to do a micro-data test on people’s labor 
turnover decisions. 
Nevertheless, workplaces do provide data on the total number of quits in the 
previous year. This makes it possible, by using information on workplace size, to 
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calculate the quit rate per plant. Range Frequency Theory has the implication that 
workers will tend to quit more when -- following a version of equation 6 -- the 
distribution of wages at the plant produces a low level of utility from the job. 
A key prediction of RFT is that negative skewness of a pay distribution leads 
to workers who are more content. This prediction arises because the mean level of 
happiness is greater if the majority of workers are near the top of the salary range paid 
by the employer. Will a measure of the skewness of wages independently predict the 
level of quits in a regression equation? We construct a test of this sort.  
After discarding the plants where fewer than 15 workers provided details to 
the survey, we are left with a usable sample of approximately 900 workplaces. Table 
8 describes the raw data. The quit rate in the sample is approximately 14% of 
employees per annum. Mean pay in the sample is approximately 258 pounds per week. 
It is also useful to have a measure of dispersion. Within plants, the standard deviation 
of pay is 147 pounds per week. Skewness of pay is here defined as: 
 
Yi −Y( )3
i=1
N
∑
(N −1)s3  
 
where Yi is the ith wage and s is the standard deviation. Its mean value is 
approximately unity. 
 Public and private sectors may have rather different kinds of labor turnover 
processes. There is close to de facto ‘tenure’ in the British public sector. In Table 9, 
the two samples are simply combined, with an intercept-shift dummy for the public 
sector. The dependent variable is given by answers to the following question: "During 
the last twelve months how many permanent employees (full and part time) stopped 
working here, because they ... left or resigned voluntarily?". 
 Column 1 of Table 9 is a parsimonious ordinary-least-squares quits equation in 
which pay, the standard deviation of pay, and skewness of pay are included as the 
only independent variables (a more formal logit equation gave the same results). This 
is not to be thought of as a general model, but it can be seen in column 1 of Table 9 
that quits are lower in high-paying plants. They are also higher where pay is more 
positively skewed (see coefficient 0.018 with a standard error of 0.006). This is 
consistent with Range Frequency Theory.  
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Column 2 of Table 9 adds in region dummies, industry dummies (to try to 
account for, among other things, ‘sunset technologies’ where there is high level of 
quits), a public-sector dummy, and measure of workplace size. The coefficient on 
Skewness falls somewhat, from 0.18 to 0.10, and marginally loses significance at the 
5% level. However, a fuller, and arguably the most natural, specification is set out in 
the third and final column of Table 9. Here the quits equation allows also for a 
number of controls of the sort suggested by labor economics -- including the 
proportion of people with occupational pensions, whether the workplace is formally 
unionized, the proportion of female workers, and two variables that capture the age 
composition of the workplace. Now the coefficient on the skewness variable is 
estimated at 0.12. This coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
Moreover, on these estimates, the effect that the shape of the pay distribution has 
upon quits is not trivially small. A one-standard-deviation increase in Skewness here 
raises the quit rate by a little more than one percentage point per annum. This is close 
in size to, for example, the effect of a one-standard-deviation drop in the proportion of 
workers over 50 years of age. 
Standard deviation of pay does not enter statistically significantly in the 
equations, but is retained as a control to ensure that skewness is not standing in for 
some simpler measure of the second moment of a distribution. Nothing of substance 
alters by removing the standard-deviation variable from the regressors. We also 
checked whether various controls for workers’ education levels entered the quits 
equation, but their coefficients were never statistically significantly different from 
zero. 
Table 10 gives the equivalent quits equation for private-sector workers alone. 
Our sample size is now slightly less than 600 workplaces, and the coefficients are not 
always precisely estimated. But the broad pattern is the same. Skewness enters in a 
statistically significant way in columns 2 and 3 of Table 10. Here the coefficient is 
approximately 0.02, and again the standard deviation of skewness is approximately 
unity, so the size of this effect is actually a little larger than in the public-plus-private-
sector full sample. Once again, the findings are consistent with a Parducci-style model. 
Finally, we experimented with another variable -- one for the average value of 
‘range’ within each establishment. This mean range variable worked with the correct 
sign but its t-statistic was not reliably larger than 2. Our instinct is that skewness here 
is a better measure theoretically, because it goes some way to capture the fact that it is 
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disproportionately the workers low down a pay distribution who are likely to quit. As 
explained earlier, skewness is also directly emphasised by Parducci.  
 
 
V Conclusion 
This paper is an attempt to understand wage comparisons and the determinants of 
well-being in the workplace. By combining laboratory and econometric evidence, the 
paper draws three conclusions.  
First, human beings do not care solely about their absolute level of pay. 
Workers are concerned, the paper shows, with their income relative to the 
remuneration levels around them in their workplace. In this sense, the work is in the 
spirit of a tradition that includes in the modern era Frank (1985), Clark and Oswald 
(1996) and Luttmer (2005), and before them Duesenberry (1949). Comparisons matter. 
Second, although we uncover some econometric evidence for a simple 
relative-income formulation in which utility is given by a function u = u(pay, relative 
pay), the main contribution of the paper is an attempt to go beyond this. Using a 
sample of 16,000 workers from 900 workplaces, the paper argues that ordinal rank 
has a statistically significant effect upon well-being, and that to understand what 
makes human beings content it is therefore necessary to look at the whole distribution 
of incomes. The paper appears to be one of the first in the industrial relations and 
economics literatures to provide workplace evidence for the importance of income 
rank.  
Third, using data on quits, the paper finds evidence that greater positive-
skewness in the pay distribution is, as Allen Parducci’s work predicts, associated with 
higher labor turnover.  
It is natural to think of possible evolutionary motives behind a concern for 
ordinal position among human beings, but it is currently not possible to say exactly 
why rank, range and skewness have the effects we observe in workplace data. 
Nevertheless, the results in this paper suggest that Range Frequency Theory -- a 
conceptual account still unknown to most economists and industrial relations 
researchers -- may be valuable to the disciplines of labor economics and industrial 
relations. 
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 This is most transparent when α = β = 1. As estimation of both α and β is 
redundant (equation 8) we set β to 1.0 and estimate only α. 
 
vii
 We also examined the behavior of a model in which the distances between wages 
prior to transformation by γ  were assumed to be given by their ratio rather than by the 
absolute difference between them. Such a model fits the data equally well. Here, 
however, we maintain a focus on absolute differences to preserve comparability with 
the Fehr-Schmidt approach. 
 
viii
 This effect was smaller in the analysis in which pay values were not 
logarithmically transformed. 
 Table 1  
The Hypothetical Annual Wages Used in Six Pay Distributions in Investigation 1 
 
 
Note: 17.2 means a value of £17,200 pounds sterling 
Pos Skew 17.2 17.6 18.1 18.7 19.5 20.3 21.4 22.7 24.3 26.1 28.4 
Neg Skew 17.2 19.5 21.3 22.9 24.2 25.3 26.1 26.9 27.5 28.0 28.4 
Unimodal 17.2 20.0 21.5 22.2 22.6 22.8 23.0 23.4 24.1 25.6 28.4 
Bimodal 17.2 17.4 17.8 18.5 20.0 22.8 25.6 27.1 27.8 28.2 28.4 
Low Range 14.3 17.1 18.6 20.0 21.4 22.8 25.9 26.8 27.5 28.0 28.4 
High Range 17.2 17.6 18.1 18.8 19.7 22.8 24.2 25.6 27.1 28.5 31.3 
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Table 2 
Control Variables Used in all Regressions in Investigation 2 
 
Measure 
Age (of the worker) 
Employer size 
Whether a temporary job 
Education 
Gender 
Race 
Union recognition at the workplace 
Occupation (SOC Code at the one-digit level) 
Industry (SIC code at the two-digit level) 
Region 
Hours worked 
Marital status 
 
Definitions Marriage is “living with spouse or partner”. Race is “white or non-white”. 
Region is the standard statistical regions of the United Kingdom. Education is the 
“highest educational qualification you hold” in six bands from None to Postgraduate 
Degree.  
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Table 3 
Correlation Matrix 
Total sample: 14703 observations 
 
 
Satisfaction 
with 
Influence 
Satisfaction 
with Pay 
Satisfaction 
with 
Achievement 
Satisfaction 
with 
Respect 
Ln(pay) Ln(mean 
pay) 
Rank Range 
Satisfaction 
with 
Influence 
1.000        
Satisfaction 
with Pay 
0.339 1.000       
Satisfaction 
with 
Achievement 
0.523 0.312 1.000      
Satisfaction 
with Respect 
0.523 0.348 0.499 1.000     
Ln(pay) 0.041 0.083 0.021 -0.021 1.000    
Ln(mean 
pay) 
0.005 0.062 -0.021 -0.030 0.680 1.000   
Rank 0.095 0.119 0.086 0.046 0.643 0.042 1.000  
Range 0.072 0.116 0.072 0.024 0.673 0.134 0.801 1.000 
 
• ‘Rank’ is the ordinal position of the worker’s wage in the hierarchy of 
wage levels being paid in the workplace. 
• ‘Range’ is the worker’s distance along the interval of wages being paid 
in the workplace. 
• Both rank and range are normalized to lie in an interval between zero 
and one. 
 
 
Summary statistics  
The means (and standard deviations in parentheses) of the variables in the data set are 
as follows: satisfaction with influence 3.53 (s.d. 0.95); satisfaction with pay 2.90 
(1.10); satisfaction with achievement 3.60 (1.00); satisfaction with respect 3.47 (1.11); 
pay 302.76 (222.53); log of pay 5.43 (0.82); mean pay 300.66 (142.35); log of mean 
pay 5.58 (0.52); rank 0.41 (0.31); range 0.37 (0.31). Ln(mean pay) stands for the log 
of mean pay, and not the mean of log pay.  
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Table 4a  
Well-being Regression Equations with Absolute Pay as an Independent Variable 
(Standard errors are in parentheses) 
 Satisfaction 
with 
Influence 
Satisfaction 
with Pay 
Satisfaction 
with 
Achievement 
Satisfaction 
with Respect 
Ln(pay) 0.128 0.556 0.119 0.057 
 (0.021) (0.026) (0.021) (0.022) 
     
#Observations     
Workplaces 1744 1744 1744 1744 
Individuals 21862 21862 21862 21862 
Log-L -28167.4 -30237.5 -28294.2 -30508.6 
Pseudo R2 0.065 0.116 0.086 0.063 
Each column is a separate kind of satisfaction equation. Ln(pay) is the log of weekly 
pay. The other controls in the regression equations are as listed in Table 2. 
 
Table 4b 
 Satisfaction 
with Influence 
Satisfaction 
with Pay 
Satisfaction 
with 
Achievement 
Satisfaction 
with Respect 
Ln(pay) 0.144 0.577 0.127 0.084 
 (0.026) (0.034) (0.026) (0.028) 
     
#Observations     
Workplaces 897 897 897 897 
Individuals 14703 14703 14703 14703 
Log-L -18830.8 -20229.4 -18943.2 -20351.7 
Pseudo R2 0.070 0.127 0.090 0.064 
This table uses only those workplaces in the data set where responses are available 
from at least 15 workers. 
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Table 5 
Well-being Regression Equations with Pay and Mean Pay in the Workplace  
as Independent Variables 
(Standard errors are in parentheses) 
 Satisfaction 
with 
Influence 
Satisfaction 
with Pay 
Satisfaction 
with 
Achievement 
Satisfaction with 
Respect 
Ln(pay) 0.171 0.554 0.159 0.115 
 (0.026) (0.033) (0.027) (0.029) 
Ln(mean pay) -0.092 0.077 -0.108 -0.105 
 (0.035) (0.041) (0.034) (0.038) 
     
#Observations     
Workplaces 897 897 897 897 
Individuals 14703 14703 14703 14703 
Log-L -18826.2 -20226.1 -18936.9 -20345.7 
Pseudo R2 0.071 0.127 0.091 0.065 
Ln(mean pay) is the log of mean weekly pay in the workplace. 
The other controls in the regression equations are as listed in Table 2. 
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Table 6a 
Well-being Regression Equations with Pay, Mean Pay, Rank  
and Range as Independent Variables 
(Standard errors are in parentheses) 
 Satisfaction 
with 
Influence 
Satisfaction 
with Pay 
Satisfaction 
with 
Achievement 
Satisfaction 
with Respect 
Ln(pay) -0.013 0.297 0.047 0.010 
 (0.040) (0.048) (0.040) (0.042) 
Ln(mean pay) 0.086 0.319 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.046) (0.059) (0.046) (0.050) 
Rank 0.359 0.356 0.215 0.256 
 (0.062) (0.071) (0.066) (0.066) 
Range 0.065 0.244 0.041 -0.015 
 (0.063) (0.069) (0.064) (0.064) 
     
#Observations     
Workplaces 897 897 897 897 
Individuals 14703 14703 14703 14703 
Log-L -18803.1 -20185.7 -18928.6 -20335.9 
Pseudo R2 0.074 0.133 0.093 0.067 
The other controls in the regression equations are as listed in Table 2. 
 
Table 6b 
Well-being Regression Equations with Pay and Rank as Independent Variables 
 Satisfaction 
with 
Influence 
Satisfaction 
with Pay 
Satisfaction 
with 
Achievement 
Satisfaction 
with Respect 
Ln(pay) 0.047 0.517 0.053 0.008 
 (0.032) (0.039) (0.031) (0.032) 
Rank 0.316 0.196 0.238 0.247 
 (0.048) (0.051) (0.048) (0.050) 
     
#Observations     
Workplaces 897 897 897 897 
Individuals 14703 14703 14703 14703 
Log-L -18805.6 -20219.5 -18928.9 -20336.0 
Pseudo R2 0.074 0.128 0.093 0.067 
The other controls in the regression equations are as listed in Table 2 
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Table 6c 
Well-being Regression Equations with Pay and Range as Independent Variables 
 Satisfaction 
with 
Influence 
Satisfaction 
with Pay 
Satisfaction 
with 
Achievement 
Satisfaction 
with 
Respect 
Ln(pay) 0.081 0.516 0.075 0.044 
 (0.031) (0.039) (0.031) (0.032) 
Range 0.198 0.191 0.161 0.127 
 (0.048) (0.054) (0.050) (0.050) 
     
#Observations     
Workplaces 897 897 897 897 
Individuals 14703 14703 14703 14703 
Log-L -18821.0 -20220.0 -18936.7 -20347.5 
Pseudo R2 0.072 0.128 0.091 0.065 
The other controls in the regression equations are as listed in Table 2 
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Table 7a  
Well-being Regression Equations with Pay and Rank as Independent Variables 
(comparisons are within an occupational group) 
(Standard errors are in parentheses) 
 Satisfaction 
with 
Influence 
Satisfaction 
with Pay 
Satisfaction 
with 
Achievement 
Satisfaction 
with Respect 
Ln(pay) -0.033 0.306 -0.036 -0.027 
 (0.062) (0.076) (0.063) (0.073) 
Rank 0.358 0.194 0.297 0.327 
 (0.078) (0.087) (0.081) (0.080) 
     
#Observations     
Workplaces 366 366 366 366 
Individuals 4249 4249 4249 4249 
Log-L -5505.8 -5784.3 -5550.2 -5869.7 
Pseudo R2 0.070 0.143 0.127 0.086 
The other controls in the regression equations are as listed in Table 2 
 
Table 7b 
Well-being Regression Equations with Pay and Range as Independent Variables 
(comparisons are within an occupational group) 
(Standard errors are in parentheses) 
 Satisfaction 
with 
Influence 
Satisfaction 
with Pay 
Satisfaction 
with 
Achievement 
Satisfaction 
with 
Respect 
Ln(pay) -0.020 0.348 -0.071 0.010 
 (0.061) (0.072) (0.062) (0.072) 
Range 0.304 0.092 0.346 0.227 
 (0.071) (0.078) (0.072) (0.073) 
 
    
#Observations     
Workplaces 366 366 366 366 
Individuals 4249 4249 4249 4249 
Log-L -5507.0 -5786.8 -5544.7 -5873.7 
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.142 0.130 0.084 
The other controls in the regression equations are as listed in Table 2 
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Table 8 
Investigation 3: Quits Analysis 
Means and standard deviations 
 
Variable mean sd 
   
Quit rate 0.144 0.174 
Mean weekly pay  257.777 127.862 
Standard deviation in weekly pay 146.973 72.318 
Skewness in weekly pay 1.074 0.956 
Largest occupation group has private pension at workplace 0.749 0.434 
Number of employees at the workplace 92.434 306.601 
Trade union recognised at the workplace 0.493 0.500 
Public-sector establishment 0.330 0.471 
Fraction employees who are female 0.571 0.294 
Fraction employees who are 20 or under 0.057 0.095 
Fraction employees who are over 50 0.154 0.116 
 
 
Notes  
Information on quits comes from the Main Management Interview in the WERS98 
Cross-Section codebook. The questionnaire asked for the annual number of voluntary 
resignations. The data stem from face-to-face interviews with the senior person at the 
workplace with responsibility for employee relations. A self-completion Employee 
Profile Questionnaire (EPQ) was sent to the workplace in advance of each interview, 
to be used for the recording of workforce data that required the respondent to consult 
workplace records. In the analysis here, this number is normalized by dividing by 
employment size. The dependent variable in later regressions is thus termed the quit 
rate in the workplace. 
Further details of the data set are available by consulting the following web address: 
www.niesr.ac.uk/research/WERS98/MAINQ/Epqname.pdf  
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Table 9 
 
Quits Regressions Equations 
Public and Private-Sector Samples Combined 
(Standard errors are in parentheses) 
 
 Eqn. 1 Eqn. 2 Eqn. 3 
    
Mean pay (£00s) -0.021 -0.015 -0.009 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
Standard deviation of pay (£00s) -0.006 -0.001 -0.004 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Skewness in pay 0.018 0.010 0.012 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Public sector  -0.063 -0.026 
  (0.014) (0.016) 
Log of workplace size  -0.006 -0.001 
  (0.004) (0.004) 
Pension (largest occupation group)   -0.049 
   (0.019) 
Union recognised at workplace   -0.031 
   (0.012) 
Fraction workforce female   -0.025 
   (0.030) 
Fraction workforce 20 or under   0.247 
   (0.116) 
Fraction workforce 50 or over   -0.130 
   (0.040) 
    
Region dummies (11) No Yes Yes 
Industry dummies (12) No Yes Yes 
    
R-squared 0.069 0.263 0.313 
N 888 888 862 
    
 
The dependent variable is the quit rate in the workplace. 
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Table 10 
Quits Equations 
Private-sector Only 
(Standard errors are in parentheses) 
 
 Eqn. 1 Eqn. 2 Eqn. 3 
    
Mean pay (£00s) -0.032 -0.014 -0.010 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) 
Standard deviation pay (£00s) 0.009 -0.006 -0.009 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) 
Skewness in pay 0.010 0.019 0.020 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Log workplace size  -0.005 0.001 
  (0.006) (0.006) 
Pension (largest occupation group)   -0.052 
   (0.022) 
Union recognised at workplace   -0.029 
   (0.014) 
Fraction workforce female   -0.067 
   (0.040) 
Fraction workforce 20 or under   0.264 
   (0.133) 
Fraction workforce 50 or over   -0.203 
   (0.058) 
    
Region dummies (11) No Yes Yes 
Industry dummies (12) No Yes Yes 
    
R-squared 0.081 0.277 0.338 
N 570 570 549 
 
The dependent variable is the quit rate in the workplace. 
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1. Two hypothetical distributions to illustrate the predictions of rank-
dependence. 
 
Figure 2. The six stimulus distributions used in Experiment 1. 
 
Figure 3. Data (symbols) and fit of the range-frequency model (solid lines) for the six 
different distributions used in Experiment 1. Each data point represents the mean of 
24 observations. 
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(Figure 3a)  
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(Figure 3b) 
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(Figure 3c) 
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